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正在阅读:为什么印度在1962年输掉了对中国的战争?

为什么印度在1962年输掉了对中国的战争?

Why did India lose the 1962 war against China?

龙腾网/兰陵笑笑生 2018-08-31 17:34:47 印度中国1962
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自古以来,两国就有着以文化、贸易和相互尊重为基础的和平关系。但是这场战争彻底改变了这个等式,播下了我们至今仍在应付着的猜疑和不信任的种子。在中国进入印度的领土阿克赛钦导致1962年的中印战争之后,在议会关于这个问题的辩论中,当时的总理尼赫鲁发言道“那里寸草不生”,试图解释阿克赛钦是一片贫瘠、荒凉的土地,这片地区被中国占领对这个国家的损失并没有多大。

评论内容:

Suresh Godara

Since  time immemorial these two countries had peaceful relations, based on  culture, trade and mutual respect for each other.

But this war changed the equation drastically sowing seeds of suspicion and mistrust we are still coping with.

After the Chinese accession of Indian land, Aksai Chin in 1962 Indo-sino war. 

In a debate in parliament over the issue,

“Nehru commented that "Not a blade of grass grows there",     attempting to explain that Aksai Chin was a barren, inhospitable  land    and the nation had lost little by its occupation by China. ”

( A statement by the then Prime Minister)

A prominent parliamentarian, Mahavir Tyagi retorted very aptly, pointing to his own bald head: "Nothing grows here ..should it be cut off or given away to somebody else?".

1962 : Indo-Sino War

Result : China won and occupied Indian land called 'Aksai Chin'

What was the reason behind our lost, was it really a lost on military part ?

This is what most of us think or made to think that we lacked a strong military to cope with attacks on our sovereignty.

But the real reason was the POLITICAL FAILURE of J.L. Nehru.

Diplomatic Failure : In maps published by China in 1954, they showed the , present 'Aksai   Chin' part of their territory, but Indian leaders just ignored it. If   apt action was taken at that right time, we would have been not facing   this relationship of mistrust and threat from our neighbor.

Forward policy : They decided unilaterally borders with China in 1957 and started   setting military posts in the disputed region inflaming the situation.   Further those posts could not be supplied properly with food,  equipment,  arms and ammunition.

Incompetent about military : Decisions at the highest level were taken without any military    appreciation, and no overall plan was made to (prepare) for a major    Chinese reaction, in fact Nehru and others believed that Chinese would   not react until the war. 

No use of IAF : This is the fact that most of the experts can't digest, instead of   having a superior Air force to China at that time, it was only used for food supplies. If IAF had been employed, situation would have been  much  different. Reason : Nehru was informed by CIA to not to use IAF as  it  could worsen the condition. (Do we get better either ?) 

Logistic failure : The army was not supplied with adequate food, ammunition and   artillery, forcing for status quo further weakening their hold. A   failure on the leadership part.

Over-trust on China: “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” was the standard diplomatic line that enjoyed unfounded importance by the state machinery in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s from Nehru and party. Though, silent are the reasons for sudden buildup of such a high-level of trust on Chinese, it could only be described as mere foolishness on the part of India. This over affectionate stance of India towards China spelled doom for the former.

Rubbishing of General Thorat’s warning reports: General Thorat from the Indian Army had prepared and submitted a report to the home ministry warning the political leadership of a much anticipated aggression from China’s side, but was ignored straight away by our political masters. Had the warnings been taken into stride on time, a large number of casualties and a massive defeat could have been prevented.

Attack on all fronts: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched an attack on all fronts simultaneously encircling India in its trap when our leadership was sitting in Delhi discussing unyielding policies. India was attacked on the wee hours on October 20, 1962 in Ladakh, northern Uttarakhand and NEFA (presently Arunachal Pradesh) at the same and caught us unawares and ill-prepared to react on time.

Where we should have learned from our past for a better future, ironically all these information  about  the defeat and factors leading to it was  made invisible to common  people. Just to hide the incompetence of J.L. Nehru and the party.

Some people are really overrated from our past, like Nehru while others are  not even given their due credit for what sacrifices they made for the country.

自古以来,两国就有着以文化、贸易和相互尊重为基础的和平关系。但是这场战争彻底改变了这个等式,播下了我们至今仍在应付着的猜疑和不信任的种子。

在中国进入印度的领土阿克赛钦导致1962年的中印战争之后,在议会关于这个问题的辩论中,当时的总理尼赫鲁发言道“那里寸草不生”,试图解释阿克赛钦是一片贫瘠、荒凉的土地,这片地区被中国占领对这个国家的损失并没有多大。

一位杰出的议员,Mahavir Tyagi非常恰当地反驳道,他指着自己的秃头说:“这里什么也长不出来,是不是也要割掉送给别人?”

1962年:印中战争

结果:中国赢得战争并占领了名为“阿克塞钦”的印度土地。

我们输掉的原因是什么,这真的是军事上的失败吗?

这就是为什么我们大多数人认为或使我们认为我们缺乏一支强大的军队来对付对我们的主权的攻击的来源。

但真正的原因是尼赫鲁的“政治失败”。

外交失败:在1954中国出版的地图中,他们展示了目前的“阿克赛钦”属于他们领土的一部分,但印度领导人却忽视了这一点。如果当时在适当的时候采取适当的行动,我们就不会面对来自我们邻国的这种不信任和威胁的关系。

前进政策:1957年,他们单方面决定与中国接壤,并开始在争议地区设立军事据点,这加剧了局势。此外,这些军事人员无法得到适当的粮食、设备、武器和弹药。

军事无能:最高级别的决定是在没有军事预备的情况下进行的,也没有为中国的重大反应做好总体的准备,事实上,尼赫鲁和其他人相信中国人在战争之前不会做出反应。

没有使用印度空军:这是让大多数专家都不能接受的,印度当时有比中国更好的空军,却只用来运食物。如果使用了印度空军,情况就会大不相同。而不用的原因是:美国中情局通知尼赫鲁不要使用空军,因为这可能会使局势恶化(难道没用有变得更好吗?)。

后勤失败:军队没有得到足够的粮食、弹药和大炮,迫使他们维持现状,进一步削弱了他们的控制力。这是领导方面的失败。

过于相信中国:“中印亲如兄弟”在1950年底和1960年初是印度标准的外交路线,国家机器从尼赫鲁和党那里得到了毫无根据的重要性。尽管沉默是对中国人突然建立如此高水平的信任的原因,但这只能被描述为印度的愚蠢。印度对中国过于友好的立场,预示着前者的灭亡。

驳斥Thorat将军的警告报告:来自印度陆军的苏拉特将军已经准备好并向内政部提交了一份报告,警告中国方面对侵略蓄谋已久,但我们的政治专家们对此一概置之不理。如果及时采取这份警告,大量伤亡和大规模失败是可以避免的。

全面进攻:当我们的领导人坐在德里讨论不妥协的政策时,中国人民解放军(PLA)发动了一场全方位的进攻,同时把印度团团围住。1962年10月20日凌晨,印度在拉达克、北方邦和NEFA(现为阿鲁纳恰尔邦)遭到袭击,我们措手不及,对作出反应准备不及。

为了更美好的未来我们应该从过去中吸取教训,具有讽刺意味的是,所有这些关于失败的信息和导致失败的因素对普通人来说都是无法得知的。因为要掩盖尼赫鲁和党的无能。

有些人在过去被我们高估了,比如尼赫鲁,而另一些人甚至没有对他们为国家所作的牺牲给予应有的赞扬。

Subhrojyoti Sarkar

Lack of preparation on the Indian side was the main cause of India's defeat in the 1962 war. But then, let's not miss out on the reasons that led to the lack of preparation:

Motive: The motive of the Indians was to send the Chinese back if they come south of the McMahon line in the NEFA (modern Arunachal Pradesh) and Aksai Chin. For this, they instituted the Forward Policy, a policy of cutting the supply of the Chinese soldiers who crossed over the McMahon line. The Indians had no motive for war. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted war and they had multiple motives to attack India:

To punish what they perceived as Indian aggression.

To stop US-Soviet-India encirclement of China at a time when the Soviets and the Americans were busy with the Cuban missile crisis.

To damage Nehru's prestige and to expose as traitorous the Soviet policy of supporting India against a communist country.

Differences in perception: The Indians did not think that the Chinese would attack. During the operation of the Forward Policy, the Indians found that the Chinese simply withdrew without engaging in a confrontation. This made the Indian establishment to think that there would be no war. The Chinese, on the other hand, felt threatened by the combination of Forward Policy and the Indian action in liberating Goa from Portuguese colonization. This made the Chinese think that India is being an aggressor and wants to claim Tibet by these piecemeal advances. So they started to prepare for an all out war whilst simultaneously withdrawing at the wake of the Forward Policy.

Zhou Enlai's lies and Nehru's blunder: Throughout the 1950's the Chinese under their Premier Zhou Enlai kept telling India and the rest of the world that China had no border disputes with India. This, even though the McMahon line was not clearly demarcated and there were differences in perception over where the line lay, coupled with Zhou's promise to Nehru even one week before the war that there would be no war, completely threw the Indian planning off track. Nehru too, stands to take the blame of not heeding to the Burmese Prime Minister Ba Swe's advice of taking caution while dealing with Zhou.

Thus, a combination of lies, underestimation and overconfidence spelt the defeat of India in the 1962 war.

印度方面缺乏准备是印度在1962年战争中失败的主要原因。但是,让我们不要忘了导致缺乏准备的原因:

动机:印度人的动机是,如果中国人越过了阿鲁纳恰尔(藏南)和阿克赛钦的麦克马洪线以南才会把他们赶回去。为此,他们制定了前进政策,即削减越过麦克马洪线的中国士兵的供应的政策。另一方面,中国人想要战争,他们有多种攻击印度的动机:惩罚他们眼中“印度的侵略”、在苏联和美国忙于古巴导弹危机之际,阻止美苏印包围中国、损害尼赫鲁的威信,暴露了苏联支持印度对抗GC主义国家的政策。

不同的看法:印度人不认为中国人会攻击印度。在前进政策的实施过程中,印度人发现中国士兵都在没有进行对抗的情况下就撤离了。这使得印度政府认为不会发生战争。另一方面,中国感到受到了前进政策和印度从葡萄牙殖民统治中解放果阿的联合行动的威胁。这使得中国认为印度是一个侵略者,并想通过这些零碎的行动来宣称西藏主权。因此,他们开始为全面战争做准备,同时在前进政策出台后撤出。

周恩来的谎言和尼赫鲁的错误:在整个20世纪50年代,中国总理周恩来领导下的中国一直在告诉印度和世界其他地区,中国与印度没有边界争端。这一点,使得尽管麦克马洪的界线没有明确划定,而且人们对这条线的位置有不同的看法,再加上周恩来在战争前一周对尼赫鲁的承诺,即不会有战争,印度的计划完全偏离了轨道。

尼赫鲁也要承担责任,因为他不听从缅甸总理巴苏关于在与周打交道时谨慎行事的建议。

因此,在1962年的战争中,谎言、低估和过度自信的组合导致了印度的失败。

Samved Iyer

I must blame that stupid Jawaharlal Nehru. He was always furious at the thought of an Army. He never paid attention to the needs of our Armed Forces. He was the worst minister because he only wanted police.

He had a stupid rule of his own to keep impressing that coward backstabber called China. He tried every way to impress China. He even rejected permanent membership in the UN Security Council which was offered to India and said that it should go to China. Had he accepted it, India would have been in a far greater strategic position regarding matters on terrorism. As a result, China regularly votes against India's petition to declare Masood Azhar as a terrorist.

He didn't allow the Indian Air Force to help our Army soldiers. Considering that in 1962, IAF was superior to Chinese air force, we could have won the war and prevented losses.

He never ensured that our Army had full supplies. In 1962 war, our soldiers ran out of supplies.

He is personally responsible for the loss of ao many soldiers, jusr because of his stupid insane logic called “Hindi Cheeni bhai bhai”. (Translated to: Indians and Chinese are brothers). Nehru was a total idiot. Accept it.

He messed up horribly.

我必须怪那个愚蠢的贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁。一想到军队,他总是很生气。他从来不注意我们军队的需要。他是最差的总理,因为他只想要警察(来维持他的统治)。

他自己有一个愚蠢的规则,不断给那个叫中国的胆小鬼留下深刻印象。他千方百计地给中国留下深刻印象。他甚至拒绝了联合国安理会常任理事国的提议,并说印度应该让给中国。如果他接受,印度在恐怖主义问题上的战略地位就会大大提高。作为结果,中国经常投票反对印度宣布Masood Azhar为恐怖分子的请愿。

他不允许印度空军帮助我们的陆军士兵。考虑到在1962年,印度空军比中国空军优越,我们本可以赢得战争并避免损失。

他从来没有保证我们的军队有充足的补给。在1962年的战争中,我们的士兵耗尽了补给。

他对印度损失的每一个士兵负有责任,因为他愚蠢的“中印亲如兄弟”的逻辑。尼赫鲁就是个白痴。请接受这个事实。

他把一切都搞砸了。

Priyatham Tummala

Nehru's blunders are the main reason. Even though tensions are rising he failed to anticipate the war.

Nehru was informed by the then premier of Burma ( now myanmar ) Ba Swe not to believe the chinese. But he did not bother. As the tensions rose along the border the then Army chief  B. M. Kaul asked Nehru to increase military budget. Nehru refused. 

The ost important blunder is not using Air Force. USA suggested not to use Air force as China may retaliate by using Air strikes on civilians. But later CIA reports revealed  that China neither had enough fuel nor nor runways long enough along the border.

Also the then Defense minister Krishna Menon (who has communist background) was  pro-chinese.  Nehru asked Indian ambassdor to China to communicate only with him directly as Menon cannot be trusted. Menon ignored intelligence reports from 1955 stating China is making preparations for war. Both Nehru and Menon  blindly believed words of  premier of China Zhou Enlai who repeatedly said that there would be no war only to mislead India.

India was not prepared militarily for the war. Also India had 10,000-12,000 soldiers while China had 80,000 soldiers.

尼赫鲁的失误是主要原因。尽管紧张局势正在加剧,但他未能预见到战争。

尼赫鲁被当时的缅甸总理巴苏告知不要相信中国人。但他没有理会。随着边境地区紧张局势的加剧,当时的陆军总司令B·M·考尔(B.M.Kaul)要求尼赫鲁增加军事预算。尼赫鲁又拒绝了。

最重要的失误是不使用空军。美国建议不要使用空军,因为中国可能会对平民实施空袭作为报复。但后来的中情局报告显示,中国没有足够的燃料,边境也没有足够长的飞机跑道。

当时的国防部长克里希纳·梅农(他有GC主义背景)也是亲中国的。尼赫鲁要求印度驻中国大使只与他直接沟通,但梅农是不可信的。梅农无视了1955年的称中国正在为战争做准备的情报报告。尼赫鲁和梅农都盲目地相信中国总理周恩来的话,后者一再表示,不会有战争,但这只会误导印度。

印度没有为战争做好军事准备。此外,印度只有1万-1.2万名士兵,而中国有8万名士兵。

Tushar Mohta

Technically, India never lost 1962 war against China.

The much hyped 1962 war ended in a stalemate with the Chinese forces attacking India and receding back from the McMohan Line on their sweetwill.

In the morning of 20th October 1962, PLA (People’s Liberation Army) of China began shelling mortars on Indian posts on duty in north-western Kashmir (present Aksai Chin) and Arunachal Pradesh. The hostilies between the two nations continued for about a month till when China marched unobstructed capturing about 20 km inland of the border in both the war fronts. By 19th November, China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther and Zhou Enlai(then President of PRC) declared a unilateral ceasefire.

Highlights of the ‘1962 Sino-Indian War’ —

India, throughout the war, was on a defensive position. High political indecision(under J.L.Nehru regarding Panchsheel and Forward Policy) led armed forces to be no less spectator than ordinary Indians. Practically, it was a one-sided war against India.

China’s hidden obxtive was to prove its dominance in South-Asia. India had repeatedly shown Aksai Chin on Indian map. India was meddling with the Tibetan issue. Moreover, India was not following the provisions of McMohan Line. China, on the other hand, could resolve the issues with a dedicated foreign policy but it rather clipped ‘Indian wings’ by its aggressive war to prove its dominance.

Both the sides did not put their navy or air force to use. This further reduced the scale of war.

India did not lose a war. Instead it lost a war-hero. The story of rifleman Jasvant Singh Ravat who single-handedly killed about 300 Chinese soldiers. The Orders for the 4 Garhwal rifles were to retreat from their position but Rifleman Jaswant Singh, remained at his post and repulsed Chinese troops for three days from overrunning the post. The local story goes that he was assisted by two Monpa girls named Sela and Nura. They had put guns at various places in such a manner that the Chinese were made to believe that the post had many soldiers. But the Chinese got hold of the man who was supplying rations to Jaswant Singh Rawat and it became known to them that only one man was guarding the post. The infuriated Chinese attacked with full force. Sula was killed in a grenade blast Nura was captured and Jaswant Singh Rawat killed by a head shot. This is the famous ‘Battle of Nuranang’

从技术上讲,印度从未输掉1962年对中国的战争。

1962年被大肆炒作的战争以中国军队进攻印度又撤退退到麦克马洪线之后,以僵局告终。1962年10月20日上午,中国人民解放军(PLA)开始炮击印度在克什米尔西北部(现为阿克赛钦)和阿鲁纳恰尔邦(Arunachal Pradesh)的执勤岗位。两国之间的敌对行动持续了大约一个月,直到中国不受阻碍地前进,在两条战争战线上占领了大约20公里的内陆边境。到了11月19日,中国已经达到了自己的要求线,所以中国人民解放军没有前进得更远,周恩来(当时的中华人民共和国总理)宣布单方面停火。

1962年中印战争的要点

在整个战争中,印度处于防御地位。政治上的高度优柔寡断使武装部队和普通印度人一样是旁观者。实际上,这是一场对印度的单方面战争。

中国隐藏的目标是证明它在南亚的统治地位。印度曾多次在印度地图上展示阿克赛钦。印度也干涉西藏问题。此外,印度没有遵守麦克莫汉线的规定。另一方面,中国可以通过一项专门的外交政策来解决这些问题,但为了证明自己的统治地位,中国却用侵略战争来扼杀“印度之翼”。

双方都没有使用他们的海军或空军。这进一步缩小了战争的规模。

印度没有输掉一场战争。相反,它失去了一位战争英雄。枪兵贾斯文·辛格·拉瓦特单枪匹马地杀死了大约300名中国士兵。上级命令要求4名步枪手撤离阵地,但辛格继续留在他的岗位上,抵御了中国士兵3天的进攻才让他们占领了这个哨所。当地的故事说,他得到了两个名为塞拉和努拉的蒙帕女孩的帮助。他们把枪放在不同的地方,使中国人相信这个哨所有许多士兵。但是中国人抓住了一个给贾斯万特·辛格·拉瓦特提供口粮的人,他们终于知道只有一个人在守卫这个岗位。愤怒的中国人全力进攻。苏拉在手榴弹爆炸中丧生,努拉被俘,贾斯万特·辛格·拉瓦特被击中头部身亡。这就是著名的“努拉南之战”

Anonymous

Because of the political background of the conflict, and the political nature of the regimes ruling India and China. The regions which were disputed had little importance, so they could not be the real reason behind a war between two such big countries. Then what was the real reason?

By 1962, the Sino-Soviet split had reached a level of unprecedented antagonism. The USSR had withdrawn all help from the PRC, and was militarizing the Sino-Russian borders. On the other hand, PRC claimed that USSR had abandoned socialism and was gradually restoring capitalism, and appealed to all communists of the world to break with the government of the Soviet unx. In this split, though Vietnam and DPRK supported PRC to some extent in the beginning, soon they too changed sides. Thus, China was isolated, in conflict with the Soviet bloc on one hand and the western bloc on the other.

In such a situation, Nehru was encouraged by both the western bloc and the Soviet bloc to follow a forward policy that would create a huge political problem for China, as the PRC did not have any allies any more. So Nehru began sending forces inside Chinese territory, despite being repeatedly discouraged by prominent military figures in India. Now, this was not much of a political issue in India, because the political consciousness of the Indian masses was lacking; their freedom movement was hijacked by Gandhians and Hindu fascists who changed it into a mere transformation from a colony to a semicolony under an indirect system of imperialist oppression. China, however, had achieved freedom through a successful revolutionary war, and its common citizens were aware of the Sino-Indian border politics to the ideological core. So, it was an ideological question for the Chinese whether to yield or not to an army being supported by imperialist powers. At some point, the Chinese decided that they’d had enough, and launched a well calculated resistance. Nehru, who had never expected the PRC to retaliate, was caught unaware. If the USSR and the western imperialist bloc participated in the war, then China would lose, but they didn’t because of the heavy damage China could cause in a land based retaliation to the USSR. It is for the same reason that India did not dare to escalate the war by using its air force. We all know what happened next.

由于冲突的政治背景,以及统治印度和中国的政权的政治性质。有争议的地区并不重要,因此它们不可能是两个这样大国之间战争的真正原因。那么真正的原因是什么?

在1962年,中苏分裂达到了前所未有的对立程度。苏联已经从中华人民共和国撤走了所有的援助,并使中俄边界军事化。另一方面,中华人民共和国声称苏联放弃了社会主义,正在逐步恢复资本主义,并呼吁世界各地的T`G人与苏联政府决裂。在这次分裂中,越南和朝鲜虽然在某种程度上支持了中华人民共和国,但很快就改变了立场。因此,中国被孤立了,一方面与苏联集团冲突,另一方面与西方集团发生冲突。

在这种情况下,西方集团和苏联集团都鼓励尼赫鲁采取前进政策,为中国制造巨大的政治问题,因为中国已经没有任何盟友了。因此尼赫鲁开始在中国领土内派遣军队,尽管印度的著名军事人士一再劝阻。现在,这在印度并不是什么政治问题,因为印度民众缺乏政治意识;他们的自由运动被甘地人和印度教法西斯分子劫持,在帝国主义压迫的间接制度下,他们简单地把印度从殖民地转变成了半殖民地。然而,中国通过一场成功的革命战争获得了自由,其普通公民意识到中印边界政治是意识形态的核心。因此,这是一个中国是否屈服于帝国主义列强支持的军队的意识形态的问题。在某种程度上,中国人认为他们已经经受够了,并发起了精心策划的抵抗。尼赫鲁从未料到中国会进行报复,从来没有意识到。如果苏联和西方帝国主义集团参加了战争,那么中国就会输掉,但他们没有这样做,因为中国可能在陆地上对苏联的报复中对他们造成严的损失。同样的原因,印度也不敢使用空军来升级战争。然后我们都知道接下来发生了什么。

Payal Sharma

Because Indian soldiers lacked everything but courage..

The blunder committed by political as well as military leadership by misreading the Chinese game and neglecting the Indian Army's preparedness, made India suffer a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Though the only thing that stood out was the iron will and cold courage of the soldiers who, though completely outnumbered and ill-equipped, fought to defend their country's honor.

As early as August, China had started accumulating arms, ammunition and rations and the signs were clear that they were preparing for war. India, however, turned a blind eye to all this. Subedar Joginder Singh, who was awarded a Param Vir Chakra posthumously, waited across a stream in Bumla axis in Arunachal Pradesh, then called the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), watching the Chinese prepare their defences.

A romantic and politically shortsighted Nehru however did not increase military spending on preparation for a possible war with China. Not only was the army denied equipment, the renowned 4th Infantry Division was used to build houses instead of preparing for war!!

Nehru appointed Lt General B.M. Kaul as Chief of Army Staff in 1961. General Kaul was confident that China would not retaliate when India sent patrols into areas disputed with China. The Chinese, however, slowly started encircling the Indian positions.

Indian forces were unprepared, ill-equipped and did not even have proper winter clothing when on 12 October Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian Army to throw the Chinese out of NEFA. On 14th October, an editorial in the People's Daily in China issued a warning to India and Nehru, 'At this critical moment, we still want to appeal once more to Mr Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble,' it said. On 20th October, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks on India. One of these was in Thag la, NEFA, while the other was in the Chushul sector of Ladakh. Both the attacks were massive in terms of troop concentration. On the Indian side, single companies of around 120 soldiers defended posts that were surrounded by thousands of enemy soldiers armed with machine guns, mortars and grenades.

The Sino-Indian war was fought at altitudes over 14,000 feet. The only shining stars of the 1962 war were the brave soldiers of the Indian Army, who fought valiantly and often to death to protect their territories. These brave hearts fought in high altitudes and freezing temperature with no jacket or proper winter boots or gloves. They used old and cumbersome .303 single action rifles of World War II vintage and LMG (Light Machine Guns) against Chinese automatics. They were outnumbered and completely mauled by the well-prepared Chinese Army but they continued to fight listening to the orders of higher commands ,"You will stay there till the last bullet and fight. Aap aakhri goli tak ladenge."

Their brave tales of unbelievable courage and fortitude tell us how soldiers don't forget their responsibilities even if politicians do.

因为印度士兵除了勇气之外什么支持都没有......

由于政治和军事领导的失误,误判了中国的动作,忽视了对印度军队的准备,使印度在1962年的中印战争中蒙受耻辱的失败。然而,唯一突出的是士兵们的钢铁意志和冷酷的勇气,他们虽然人数少,装备差,却为捍卫国家的荣誉而战斗。

早在8月份,中国就开始积累武器、弹药和口粮,明显的迹象表明,他们正在准备战争。然而,印度对这一切视而不见。苏贝达尔·乔金德·辛格,他死后被授予帕拉姆·维尔·查克拉勋章,在阿鲁纳恰尔邦的边境眼睁睁看着中国人在准备他们的防线。

然而天真的、政治上目光短浅的尼赫鲁并没有增加军事开支,以准备可能的对华战争。他不仅拒绝为军队提供装备,而且著名的第四步兵师被用来建造房屋而不是备战!

尼赫鲁于1961年任命考尔少将为陆军参谋长。考尔将军相信,当印度派遣巡逻队进入与中国有争议的地区时,中国不会进行报复。然而,中国人却悄悄地包围了印度的阵地。

当尼赫鲁在10月12日宣布命令印度军队将中国军队赶出东北时,印度军队没有做好准备,装备不足,甚至没有适当的冬装。10月14日,《中国人民日报》的一篇社论向印度和尼赫鲁发出警告,“在这个关键时刻,我们仍然希望再次向尼赫鲁呼吁:请悬崖勒马。 不要把印度军队的生命作为赌注。10月20日,中国人民解放军对印度发动了两次进攻。其中一个在东北部的拉加格,另一个在拉达克的丘舒尔区。这两次袭击都是集中部队的大规模的进攻。在印度方面,由大约120名士兵组成的保卫的哨所的连队被数千名配备机枪、迫击炮和手榴弹的敌军士兵包围。

中印战争是在海拔14,000英尺的高度上进行的。1962年战争中唯一的闪亮的是勇敢的印度军队士兵,他们英勇地战斗,常常以死亡的方式保卫自己的领土。这些勇敢的心在没有外套,没有合适的冬季靴子或手套的情况下,在高海拔和严寒中战斗。他们使用老式和笨重的第二次世界大战老式单发步枪和LMG(轻型机枪)来对付中国的自动武器。他们的人数远远不如中国军队,而且受到了准备充分的中国军队全方位的打击。但他们仍然听从最高长官的“战斗至最后一颗子弹”的命令继续战斗。

他们关于难以置信的勇气和坚韧的勇敢故事告诉我们,即使政客们忘记了自己的责任,士兵们也不会忘记。

Haiyang Zheng

Because PRC was established by a strong army. You can count how many wars PLA had fought at that time. First-phase of civil war, WWII against Japan, second-phase of civil war and capturing their opponent soldiers instead of killing them, war with US on Korea. They repelled invaders from and defended their motherland. The commanders and soldiers were fearless and they knew they need to prepare for the battle. See what India got? No war with Brits. That’s the difference.

因为中华人民共和国是由一支强大的军队建立的。你可以数一数当时解放军打了多少场战争。第一阶段的内战、第二次世界大战对日本、第二阶段的内战只俘虏他们对手的士兵而不是杀死他们、与美国在朝鲜的战争。他们击退了侵略者,保卫了祖国。指挥官和士兵们无所畏惧,他们知道他们需要为这场战斗做准备。再看看印度?他没有为了独立而和英国开战,这就是差距。

Kai Tang

India saw itself as the center, they saw the UK, US as “assistance”.

Even today, Indians sees itself as the center, Japan and US as the “assustance”.

India’s pride was the cause of blunder. The reality is the west sees India as a proxy against China. The west will not die for Indians. Neither US, Japan recognizes Kashmir as part of India, neither of them are allies of India.

“Know your enemy, and know yourself, in a hundred battles , you shall never be in peril.”

India rarely calculates correctly, the strength of the other side. Its elite class falsely believes in India’s supremecy. Wars are often lost by pride.

In 1962, War was lost before it even began.

因为当时印度视自己为中心,他们视英国、美国为“援助”。

即使在今天,印度人也把自己当作中心,而视日本和美国是自己的“外援”。

印度的骄傲是错误的原因。现实情况是,西方将印度视为对抗中国的代理人。西方不会为印度人而死。美国和日本都不承认克什米尔是印度的一部分,也不是印度的盟友。

“知己知彼,百战不殆。”

印度很少正确计算对方的实力。它的精英阶层错误地相信印度的霸权。战争常常因骄傲而失败。1962年,战争在战争开始之前印度就已经失败了。

本文来源:https://www.quora.com

免责声明:本文编译自互联网,不代表《歪果仁看中国》的观点和立场。

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